A Democratic Strategy Toward Asia

Though we are only a few years into the 21st Century, it is evident that American foreign policy will be more strongly influenced by events in Asia than at any other time in American history. From the Indian Ocean tsunami to North Korea’s nuclear weapons, from China’s ascendancy to Australia’s commitment in the “War on Terror,” the politics of Asia are increasingly becoming the politics of America as well. This turn of events calls for not only a recommitment to the alliances of the past, but also a realignment of policies that will allow for greater cooperation in the future.

I. China

China remains the 800-pound gorilla in East Asian politics and is perhaps the single most important determinant of success or failure of American policy in that region. A pragmatic China policy treats the Middle Kingdom neither as a “strategic competitor” nor as an unqualified “strategic partner.” Such labels have a danger of forcing a situation that arises between the US and China to fit the pre-defined policy, instead of shaping the policy to fit the situation, as is required of a robust American strategy. Bilateral trade and China’s internal politics are outside the scope of this paper.

Terrorism
In the aftermath of 9/11, China was seen as an ally in the struggle against Islamist extremism. Though there may have been real successes in combating al Qaeda with Chinese cooperation, we must not lose sight of the fact that Beijing can, and has, very easily turned our “War on Terror” into its own campaign against the Muslim Uighur population in Xinjiang. Just as Muslim-American groups have complained about discriminatory treatment post-9/11 in the US, so have Uighur groups in China, except there they are not so lucky to have a First Amendment shield. Therefore, we must be careful to accurately assess China’s enthusiasm for prosecuting the “War on Terror,” taking pains to make sure that Beijing’s zeal to contain the Uighurs, who thus far have little ties to al Qaeda, does not further stoke the nascent fires of Muslim extremism.

Taiwan
On the issue of Taiwan, China’s growing military and economic power will dictate that the US continue to treat the island as a poison pill that we must swallow in order to maintain nominal relations with the mainland. No American President can allow Taiwan, a democratic capitalist ally, to be invaded by China. At the same time, no American President can afford to let either the American, Chinese, or Taiwanese sides upset the status quo. Progress on this issue must come organically from both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The US must be unequivocal in its support for Taiwanese democracy, but within the current paradigm of Taiwanese autonomy without full independence. American diplomats and policymakers should be advised to carefully vet all remarks about Taiwan for reaction on both sides of the Strait.

There is, however, a small window of opportunity in that Taiwan should be allowed to play a larger role on the world stage by being accredited observer status in international organizations such as the World Health Organization or (in the case of the nine tribal groups recognized by Taiwan’s government) the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Peoples. The US may also be able to support symbolic gestures such as having a portion of the 2008 Olympic torch relay pass through Taipei, Kinmen, or Matsu. The upshot of the recent New Year’s direct flights between China and Taiwan may be a willingness by Beijing to even have certain Olympic events held in Taiwan. In any event, the US must make it clear to the Taiwanese administration that though we are sympathetic to the “name rectification” campaign, the US cannot lend its public or diplomatic support.

Military Affairs
The US should leverage economic incentives with the EU, Israel, and Russia in order to stem the flow of high-tech weapons to China. While China’s current rate of military spending is unsustainable in the long run, given the more pressing problems of its domestic development, Beijing still hungers for a military status worthy of a “great power.” The US must convince the EU, and by extension Israel and Russia, to deny China the option of simply buying its way to great power status. Recent efforts by the EU to lift its arms embargo against China should be kept within an economic framework and the US should show willingness to compromise on certain issues such as greater access to the Chinese market for EU firms with regard to certain dual use technologies. This would preserve the arms embargo while satisfying EU concerns about Euro-Chinese market share. Similar deals should be struck with Israel and Russia, China’s major arms suppliers. The US should especially leverage its influence with Israel to dissuade it from making any new arms deals with China.

Maintaining the arms embargo, imposed in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square protests, is not inconsistent with other US policy objectives toward China. The embargo does not impact other avenues of trade and investment, but it does send a signal that the US will not accept unchecked Chinese obstructionism in international affairs, especially as it relates to Taiwan. First, while China has historically maintained an isolationist policy, the current regime has a more internationalist approach. Witness the recent joint military exercises with India and Russia, as well as the push to create the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as an augmentation of ASEAN. Second, it is axiomatic that any and all military capability China acquires can, and most likely would, be used against Taiwan. The US should soften or lift the embargo only contingent upon both an end to Chinese obstructionism, especially in the UN Security Council, and positive steps toward reconciliation with Taiwan.

II. Korea

The Bush Administration’s focus on the Iraq situation has had the definite effect of taking away attention from the deteriorating US-South Korean relationship as well as the events in North Korea. While the US was successful in leveraging China to bring North Korea into the six-party talks, these negotiations have, so far, been a failure. They did not deter North Korea from further developing its nuclear weapons program, nor did they result in a replacement for the 1994 Agreed Framework. However, despite the substantive failure of the six-party talks, they should not be abandoned altogether because the outcome would be to further isolate the North at a time when greater engagement is critical.

Rather than continue to isolate North Korea, the US should encourage South Korea’s “sunshine policy” of limited familial and tourist contacts with the North. Dealing with the problem of North Korea’s embryonic nuclear capability will require more radical measures. One method is to simply buy off the North. This approach would in practice be more like the Iraq-style “oil-for-food” program than the old Agreed Framework. Similar to the EU approach to Iran, a buyout approach would either entail a pledge from North Korea to comply with inspections or to sell its enriched uranium stocks to the US, in exchange for economic benefits like food aid or non-military technology. There is, of course, a chance that Kim Jong-Il will refuse such an offer, but the offer must still be made.

III. Japan

In a national security context, Japan shares with the US a fear of a nuclear North Korea and a China that is willing to flex its military muscle. This shared threat assessment makes it logical for the US to support Japan’s planned constitutional changes to allow for a restructuring of the Japanese military. However, such steps must be taken with extreme caution because Japan’s motives, in light of its historical aggression, are suspect especially in China and the Koreas. The US should not take any overt steps to assist Japan in implementing its rearmament beyond the terms of our treaty with Japan. Nor should the US shift its defense posture in any way that might signal a withdrawal from Japan (which may be interpreted by China and the Koreas as Japan attaining military self-sufficiency).

IV. Regional security and development – Oceania

In light of the recent Indian Ocean tsunami, and continuing concerns about global warming, the island countries of the Pacific Ocean have made their very existence their highest priority. As part of an overall US re-thinking and rapprochement with the Kyoto Protocol, we should take into account the needs of the Pacific Ocean island states even if they currently have little geo-strategic value. As these and other states around the world grow desperate for cash, some might allow passport selling, money laundering, and other activities that can and has been tied to terrorism. In the worst case scenario, a catastrophic collapse of the economies of one of these island states may send a deluge of refugees to Australia, New Zealand, or even Hawaii. The US ignores such “quiet” areas of the world at its own peril.

V. Regional security and development – Southeast Asia

Given time, the economies of Southeast Asia have the potential to achieve the same kind of growth and prosperity as the “tiger” economies did in the 1980’s and 1990’s. The US should seek to rapidly upgrade its relationship with ASEAN beyond free trade agreements to a level comparable to that of the EU. Though ASEAN is hardly as institutionally or politically unified as the EU, a status upgrade is nevertheless in the American interest. Not only would it signal the importance of the ASEAN bloc in matters not limited to trade, but it would also serve to counterweigh China’s growing influence in the region.

While Australia has taken up a significant share of the aid burden in Southeast Asia, there is plenty of room for the US to play a role as well. This is not altruism, but rather integrated into the calculus of checking terrorism. East Timor, Papua New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands could easily slide into failed statehood if they do not continue to receive international support. Additionally, the threat of Islamist extremism breeding terrorism should still greatly concern the US vis-à-vis Aceh, Malaysia, and the southern Philippines.

VI. Australia and New Zealand

The paradigm of American relations with Australia and New Zealand has for decades been the ANZUS security pact. The US should use ANZUS as the foundation for other security arrangements in East Asia, particularly with countries like the Philippines or Taiwan. Due to their geographic proximity, both Australia and New Zealand will be directly affected in the fallout of either a terrorist attack or economic collapse anywhere in Southeast Asia or Oceania. The Bali bombings and the situations in East Timor, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Nauru all prove this point. As such, it is in America’s interest to build on our relationship with both Australia and New Zealand on issues such as joint aid coordination and burden sharing.

by William Lim